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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SEARCHING FOR THE PROPER BAL
ANCE IN DEFINING A MIRANDA INTERROGATION: THREE PERSPEC
TIVES ON RHODE ISLAND V. INN.IS, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Miranda v. Arizona,l the United States Supreme Court .
held that "the prosecution may not use statements, whether excul
patory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination."2 The
Court also stated in dictum, 3 "[i]f the individual states that he
wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is
present."4 Recently, in Rhode Island v. Innis,S the United States
Supreme Court held that the "term interrogation under Miranda
refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or ac
tions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant
to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. "6 The
Court defined "interrogation" from the viewpoint of the police
rather than from the perspective of the suspect or of a reasonable
person in the position of the suspect. Innis joins other Burger
Court decisions in a "fundamental rejection of the premises of
Miranda . ... "7 Innis also rejects an approach advanced by Justice
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. Id. at 444. The procedural safeguards include warning the defendant that
"he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as ev
idence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either re
tained or appointed." Id.
3. The directive is dictum because none of the cases before the Court in
Miranda involved a defendant who asked to consult with counsel. A technical read
ing of Miranda thus would enable the Court in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291
(1980), to label the Miranda directive as not controlling. The Court has not used this
approach in dealing with subsequent Miranda issues since Harris \T' New York, 401
U.S. 222 (1971). See Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SUP.
CT. REV. 99, 107-08 (1977). Notably, the Innis Court refused to utilize the dictum ap
proach. Instead, the Court phrased the issue as "whether the respondent was 'inter
rogated' by the police officers in violation of the respondent's undisputed right un
der Miranda to remain silent until he had consulted with a lawyer." 446 U.S. 291,
298 (1980).
4. 384 U.S. at 474.
5. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
6. Id. at 301.
7. Stone, supra note 3, at 168. For a discussion of the Burger Court treatment of
787
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Stevens that more faithfully adheres to the concerns underlying
Miranda. 8

On January 17, 1975 at about 4:30 a.m.,9 Thomas Innis was ar
rested at gunpoint 10 by a Providence police officer on a public
street for the kidnapping, robbery, and murder of a cab driver that
had occurred a few days earlier. l l Although all three crimes had
been committed with a shotgun, Innis did not have the gun when
arrested. 12 The arresting officer promptly handcuffed Innis 13 and,
pursuant to Miranda,14 advised him of his constitutional rights,
including the right to speak to an attorney. IS When two other offi
cers repeated the warnings,16 Innis stated that he wanted to see an
attorney.17 The police then ceased interrogation 18 and placed Innis
in a car for the ride to headquarters. 19 The officer in charge in
structed the three patrolmen accompanying Innis not to question
or coerce the latter in any way during the ride. 20 En route to the
station one of the officers stated, "'there's a lot of handicapped
children running around in this area, and God forbid one of them
might find a weapon with shells and they might hurt them
selves.' "21 Innis, who clearly was able to hear the conversation,
asked the police to return to the scene of the arrest so that he
could show them where the shotgun was hidden. 22 The patrol
wagon returned to the scene of the arrest where Innis again was
warned of his rights. He acknowledged that he understood them
Miranda, see note 191 infra.
8. See 446 U.S. at 307-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens' dissent is
discussed in text accompanying notes 195-206 infra.
9. [d. at 293-94.
10. Brief of the Respondent Innis at 4, Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 291.
11. [d. at 295.
12. [d. at 294.
13. Brief of the Respondent Innis at 4, Rhode Island v. Innis, id. at 291.
14. [d.
15. For a full discussion of the Miranda rights and the procedures that must be
followed once the rights are invoked, see text accompanying notes 67-72 infra.
16. 446 U.S. at 294.
17. [d.
18. 391 A.2d U58, U69 (1978) (Kelleher, J., dissenting), vacated, 446 U.S. at
291.
19. [d. at 294.
20. [d.
21. [d. at 294-95. Two other versions of the conversation were related by the
other police officers in the car. According to one version, the police officer said,
" '[Ilt would be too bad if the little ... girl-would pick up the gun, maybe kill her
self.' " [d. at 295. See also White, Rhode Island v. Innis: The Significance of a Sus
pect's Assertion of His Right to Counsel, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53 n.7 (1979).
22. 446 U.S. at 295.
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and then led the police to the hidden shotgun. 23 At the time Innis
indicated that the officers should tum back, the car had traveled no
more than a mile from the scene of the arrest and only a few min
utes had elapsed. 24
At the murder trial the judge assumed, without deciding, that
the police conversation constituted an interrogation. 25 Although
Miranda prohibits police interrogation of a custodial suspect after
the suspect has invoked his right to an attorney,26 the trial judge
held that Innis' Miranda rights had not been violated. The judge
concluded that, although Innis had invoked his Miranda right to an
attorney, he had waived his rights by leading the police to the
buried gun 27 before consulting with counsel. Without determining
whether the police had interrogated Innis, the court allowed the
gun to be admitted into evidence. The jury returned verdicts of
guilty on all charges. 28
On ~eal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed the
murder conViction, holding that the "handicapped child conversa
tion" amounted to an interrogation at a time when interrogation
was prohibited by Miranda. 29 The court also held that Innis had
not waived his Miranda rights; thus, the shotgun should not have
been admitted into evidence. 30
The United States Supreme Court held that the contested
conversation was not an interrogation within the meaning of
Miranda. According to the Court, the term "interrogation" under
Miranda refers both to express questioning and to anything reason
ably likely to elicit an incriminating response from a suspect. 31
Justice White concurred, preferring to reverse the judgment for
the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Brewer v.
Williams. 32 The court refused to adopt his Brewer views and J us
23. Id.
24.

[d.

25. Id. at 308 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
26. 384 U.S. at 444-45.
27. 446 U.S. at 308 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 296.
29. 391 A.2d at 1162.
30. Id. at 1164.
31. 446 U.S. at 301.
32. 430 U.S. 387 (1977). As discussed more fully in the text accompanying
notes 97-106 infra, defendant Williams was indicted on abduction charges and then
was accompanied by police officers on a 160-mile ride back to Des Moines where
his arrest warrant had been issued. Id. at 392. Prior to the trip, Williams was advised
by a local attorney not to make any statements about the abduction until he had
consult,ed with a Des Moines attorney. Id. at 391. During the ride, however,
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tice White joined the Innis opinion in order to reverse the state
court decision. Chief Justice Burger also concurred in the judg
ment. 33 He felt the Innis result was "not inconsistent with
Miranda . . . . "34 Although the Chief Justice concurred in the de
cision, he expressed fear that the Court's test would introduce new
elements of uncertainty in establishing the boundaries of
Miranda. 3s Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented on the ground
that the Court had misapplied its own test. They were in substan
tial agreement with the majority's definition of interrogation. 36
They understood the majority opinion to require "an objective in
quiry into the likely effect of police conduct on a typical individual,
taking into account any special susceptibility of the suspect to cer
tain kinds of pressure of which the police know or have reason to
know."37 Justices Marshall and Brennan were "utterly at a loss,
however, to understand how this objective standard as applied to
the [Innis] facts ... can rationally lead to the conclusion that there
was no interrogation .... "38 They continued, "the notion that such
an appeal [by the police officer to the conscience of Innis] could
not be expected to have any effect unless the suspect were known
to have some special interest in handicapped children verges on
the ludicrous. "39
Justice Stevens dissented to the new definition of interrogation
and advanced an alternative. Under his definition any statement
"that would normally be understood by the average listener as call-

Williams made incriminating statements after one of the officers delivered the infa
mous "Christian burial speech." [d. at 393. In a 5 to 4 decision, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that Williams' sixth amendment right to counsel had been vio
lated at the time he made the incriminating remarks and that no waiver of that right
had occurred. [d. at 406. Justice White dissented on the ground that Williams had
made a knowing and intentional waiver of his sixth amendment right when he chose
to make the incriminating statements in the absence of his attorney. [d. at 435. Jus
tice White felt that implicit in the majority's holding was the suggestion that the
sixth amendment creates a right not to be asked any questions in counsel's absence
rather than a right not to answer any questions in counsel's absence and that the
right not to be asked questions must be waived before the questions are asked. In
Justice White's view, "Absent coercion ... an accused is amply protected by a rule
requiring waiver before or simultaneously with the giving by him of an answer or
the making by him of a statement." [d. at 436-37.
33. 446 U.S. at 304 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
34. [d.
35. [d.
36. [d. at 305. (Marshall, J., with Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. [d.
38. [d.
39. [d. at 305.
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ing for a response 40 • . . as well as those [statements] that are de
signed to do so, should be considered interrogation. "41 Justice Ste
vens also dissented to the application of the new majority test to
Innis' facts. In his view, the trial record was incomplete because
the trial judge had assumed, but failed to decide, whether an inter
rogation had occurred. Justice Stevens felt that the proper proce
dure would be to remand the case to the trial court for findings di
rected at the new standard. 42
This note maintains that the Rhode Island Supreme Court's
finding of interrogation was based upon an inapposite United States
Supreme Court case, an improper subjective standard, and an in
complete analysis of the circumstances under which the interroga
tion occurred. Despite these shortcomings, the final conclusion of
the Rhode Island Supreme Court can be supported by an objec
tive, reasonable person standard. 43 Under this standard the court
would fully analyze the atmosphere of coercion created by the po
lice and determine whether a reasonable person in Innis' position
would feel compelled to retrieve the missing shotgun following the
police conversation. The objective, reasonable person approach is
the best test for interrogation analysis because it adheres to the un
derlying rationale of Miranda. It continues to provide the custodial
suspect with meaningful protection against compelled self-incrim
ination induced by police pressures. The United States Supreme
Court majority's treatment of the Innis interrogation issue repre
sents a significant departure from the foundations of Miranda and
should be reconsidered.

II.
A.

MIRANDA AND ITS BACKGROUND

Pre-Miranda Treatment of the Fifth Amendment

The fifth amendment provides, in part, that no person "shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself
. . . ."44 The Supreme Court has interpreted the amendment to
prohibit the prosecution45 from compelling self-incriminating an
40. ld. at 309 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41. ld. at 311.
42. ld. at 314.
43. This test has been used by numerous lower courts in analyzing the custo
dial issue. See Hunter v. State, 590 P.2d 888 (Alaska 1979) (collecting cases). The
same test should be used in analyzing the interrogation issue. See footnote 187 infra.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. v.
45. In Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), the Court held that the fifth amend
ment privilege applied to the states and that the standards underlying the privilege
applied to state court proceedings. ld. at 6.
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swers in civil or criminal proceedings, whether judicial or extraju
dicial, if such answers might be used against the individual in a
criminal trial. 46 The amendment prohibits only compelled self
incrimination. Thus, in the absence of official coercion, self
incriminating statements do not conflict with the constitutional
guarantee. 47
Prior to Miranda, the Court struggled to articulate a standard
against which to judge the admissibility of confessions obtained
through police interrogation. The Court had long recognized the
importance of confes'sions to law enforceIl!ent efforts. 48 The Court
had become increasingly disturbed with gross violations of constitu
tional rights by overzealous police officers. For example, in Brown
v. Mississippi,49 a state homicide conviction was based upon a con
fession obtained through physical torture. 50 The Court found the
whole procedure "revolting to the sense of justice" and ruled it in
violation of the fourteenth amendment due process clause. 51 In
1931, a congressional commission studying law enforcement con
firmed the Court's fears that unrestricted custodial police interro
gations resulted in untrustworthy confessions and loss of public
confidence in the criminal justice system. In the words of the
commission:
[~]ot only does the use of the third degree involve a flagrant vio

lation of law by the officers of the law, but it involves also the
dangers of false confessions, and it tends to make police and
prosecutors less zealous in the search for objective evidence ....
"If you use your fists, you are not so likely to use your wits."
. . . "ne third degree brutalizes the police, hardens the pris
oner against society, and lowers the esteem in which the admin
istration of justice is held by the public."52
46. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Amdstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924) (privilege upheld in
bankruptcy proceeding) in which the Court stated, "The privilege is not ordinarily
dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in which the testimony is sought or is
to be used. It applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer
might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it." See also Quinn v.
United States, 349 U.S. 155, 163 (1955) (Congressional inquiry).
47. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977).
48. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 578-80 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., writ
ing the majority opinion in which Stewart, J., joined).
49. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
SO. ld. at 284.
51. ld. at 286.
'52. IV National Comm'n on Law Observance & Enforcement, Rep. on Lawless
ness in Law Enforcement 5 (1931) (Wickersham Repo~).
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During the thirty years following Brown, the Court developed
. a test requiring examination of the "totality of the circumstances" to
determine the voluntariness of a confession obtained through police
interrogation. 53 The voluntariness test "proved to be highly subtle
and elusive. "54 The courts had to examine numerous variables in
order to balance police behavior in obtaining the confession against
the ability of the accused to decide freely whether to admit, to
deny, or to refuse to answer.55 The courts considered such factors
as: Duration and nature of the incommunicado custody; presence
or absence of advice concerning the defendant's constitutional
rights; and granting or refusing requests to communicate with law
yers, relatives, or friends. 56 Many state courts used the ambiguity
of the "totality ·of the circumstances" concept to uphold confessions
that, if not clearly unconstitutional, were of questionable validity. 57
For example, in Davis v. North Carolina,58 the North Carolina Su
perior and Supreme Courts held a confession to be voluntary, de
spite police notations on the arrest sheet stating, "Do not allow
anyone to see Davis. Or allow him to use the telephone . . . ";59
and despite the fact that no one but the police spoke to Davis dur
ing the sixteen days of detention and interrogation that preceded
his confession. 60
It thus appeared inevitable that the Court would seek "some
automatic device by which the potential evils of incommunicado in
terrogation [could] be controlled."61 The Court took a major step
toward this goal by holding in Massiah v. United States 62 that a
post-indictment interrogation was a "critical stage" of the prosecu
tion to which the sixth amendment right to counsel attached. 63
Thus, incriminating statements elicited from the accused after he
had been indicted but before he had consulted with counsel were

53. Stone, supra note 3, at 102.
54. Id.
55. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 534 (White, J., with Harlan & Stewart, JJ.,
dissenting).
56. Id.
57. Stone, supra note 3, at 102.
58. 221 F. Supp. 494 (E.D.N.C. 1963), aff'd, 339 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1964),
rev'd, 384 U.S. 737 (1966).
59. Id. at 744.
60. Id. at 745.
61. Stone, supra I}ote 3, at 103 n.21.
62. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
63. Id. at 205-06.
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excluded. 64 One month later, the Court in Escobedo v. Illinois 65
seemed to extend the reach of the sixth amendment right to coun
sel to pre-indictment interrogations. The precise scope of Escobedo
was left unclear because the Court expressly limited its holding to
the facts at hand. 66
B.

Miranda

Two years after issuing Escobedo, the United States Supreme
Court shifted its focus from the sixth to the fifth amendment and
issued Miranda. The Court felt compelled to "apply more exacting
restrictions than [that employed by] the Fourteenth Amendment's
voluntariness test" in determining the admissibility of confessions
resulting from police interrogation. 67 The Court was concerned
with the "inherently compelling pressures which . . . undermine
the individual's will to resist and ... [which] compel him to speak
where he would not otherwise do so freely [during custodial inter
rogation. ]"68 The Court concluded that, to offset the coercive pres
sures inherent in custodial interrogation and to safeguard the fifth
amendment right against the "potentiality for compulsion," the
prosecution in a criminal case could not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation
of the suspect unless it demonstrated the use of procedures effec
tive to protect the fifth amendment privilege. 69 These procedures

64. ld. at 206. As discussed more fully at text accompanying notes 129-135
infra, the sixth amendment ensures that after a certain point the accused must be
shielded from the state by an attorney. This shield requires the state to establish
guilt by evidence independently and freely secured. The State may not prove its
charge against the accused by coercing statements from him. It thus becomes impor
tant tor sixth amendment purposes to determine at what point of the prosecution an
accused is constitutionally entitled to have an attorney present during his meeting
with the state.
65. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
66. Stone, supra note 3, at 103. The Escobedo Court held that
where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect
has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interro
gations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has
requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and
the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional
right to remain silent, the accused has been denied "the Assistance of Coun
sel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution ....
378 U.S. at 490-91.
67. 384 U.S. at 511 (Harlan, J., with Stewart & White, JJ., dissenting).
68. ld. at 467.
69. ld. at 444.
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included warning the individual prior to questioning that he had a
right to remain silent, that any statement he made could be used
as evidence against him, and that he had a right to the assistance of
counsel, retained or appointed. 70 The suspect could waive these
rights if the waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelli
gently.71 If the individual indicated in any manner at any stage of
the process that he wished either to consult an attorney or not to
be questioned, the interrogation had to cease. 72
The aim of the Miranda safeguards was to eliminate all pres
sures beyond those inherent in arrest and detention. 73 The coer
cive pressures produced solely by arrest and detention were not
found to be substantial enough to require Miranda's "protective"
warnings. 74 Instead, the Court believed that the level of compul
sion that would jeopardize exercise of the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination was reached when both custody and
interrogation were present. The Court recognized that the inter
play between police interrogation and police custody, each condi
tion reinforcing the pressures and anxieties produced by the other,
made custodial police interrogation devastating for the suspect. 75
The Court stated, "An individual swept from familiar surroundings
into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and sub
jected to the techniques of persuasion described cannot be other
wise than under compulsion to speak. "76
If one of the components, interrogation or custody, is missing
there is no custodial interrogation. Statements made to the police
in such circumstances are admissible regardless of whether
Miranda warnings were given. Thus, volunteered statements of
any kind are not barred by the fifth amendment and are not af
fected by the Miranda holding. 77 They do not result from an inter
rogation because police-induced pressures have not impaired the
capacity of the defendant to decide ra,tionally whether to speak to

70. The Miranda Court recognized that the Constitution does not require any
particular solution to the problem of ensuring compliance with the fifth amendment.
The Court thus declared that other procedures can be used which are at least as ef
fective in apprising the accused of his fifth amendment rights. 384 U.S. at 467:
71. Id. at 444.

72. Id.
73. Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda: What is "Interroga
tion"? When Does it Matter?, 67 CEO. L.J. 1, 18 (1978).
74. Id. at 18 n.1l2.
75. Id. at 63.
76. 384 U.S. at 461.
77. Id. at 478.
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the police. 78 Similarly, statements obtained through police inter
views conducted in the home of the suspect, where the suspect is
free to terminate the meeting, are not affected by the decision.
There is no custody because the suspect has not been cut off from
the outside world and subjected to compulsion within the meaning
of Miranda. 79
Miranda defined custodial interrogation as questioning initi
ated by law enforcement officers after a person had been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any sig
nificant way.80 Through this definition and the safeguards outlined
above, Miranda sought to harmonize the public interest in discov
ery and punishment of criminal offenders with the individual inter
est in freedom from compulsory self-incrimination. Dissatisfaction
with the balance struck by Miranda, however, was clearly evident.
Dissenting, Justice White wrote, "Even if the new concept can be
said to have adv~ntages of some sort-over the present law, they are
far outweighed by its likely undesirable impact on other very rele
vant and important interests. "81
C.

Application of Miranda

Tension between law enforcement needs, fifth amendment in
terests, and confusion over the proper definition of "custodial in
terrogation" exists today as in 1966 when Miranda was decided. 82

78. ld. at 465.
79. See Kamisar;supra note 73, at 68.
80. 384 U.S. at 444.
81. Id. at 539 (White, J., with Harlan & Stewart, J]., dissenting). According to
Justice White, the Miranda decision would have several undesirable consequences.
First, with loss of protection of the criminal law, people would engage in violent
self-help, employing guns, knives, and the help of sympathetic neighbors. Second,
the decision would have a corrosive effect on the criminal law as an effective device
to prevent crime: "[tlhe easier it is to get away with rape and murder, the less the de
terrent effect on those who are inclined to attempt it." Id. at 543. Third, release of a
defe~dant who has confessed or would do so in response to noncoercive questioning
might constitute a callous disregard for his welfare because no attempt would be
made to help him following his confession. Fourth, the decision might delay release
of the innocent because an individual arrested on probable cause would no longer
be able to extricate himself quickly by listening to the circumstances of his arrest
and explaining his own actions. These acts would have to await the hiring or ap
pointment of an attorney, consultations with counsel, and a session with the police.
Finally, the decision would slow down the investigation and apprehension of con
federates in cases where time is of the essence, particularly those involving national
security or organized crime. Id. at 542-44.
82. See generally Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970) for lengthy treatment of "cus
todial" cases. See Criminal Procedure-Interrogation in Violation of Miranda-State
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Courts have differed in their treatment of the interrogation issue.
For example, jurisdictions disagree over whether the reading of a
ballistic report to a defendant constitutes an interrogation. In
Combs v. Wingo,83 the Sixth Circuit held that such a reading was
an implied question, hence an interrogation. 84 The opposite con
clusion was reached by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Combs v.
Commonwealth. 85 Similarly, courts disagree over the significance
of a confrontation between codefendants. In People v. Doss,8s the
court ruled that no interrogation occurred when defendant was
brought into the presence of codefendant who told defendant to
reveal the location of the weapon. 87 In Commonwealth v. Hamil
ton,88 however, the court held that an interrogation took place
when the police arranged a confrontation between defendant and
the accomplice at which the accomplice accused defendant of the
crime. 89
Innis required the Rhode Island Supreme Court to clarify the
meaning of interrogation, left unresolved by Miranda. The factual
setting in which Innis' interrogation took place demonstrates the
need for continued judicial review of the balance Miranda struck
between law enforcement needs and fifth amendment protections.
In light of the difficulty that courts have had in striking the perfect
balance between these two interests, Innis presented the Rhode Is
land Supreme Court with a challenging task.
III.

RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT DECISION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court began its treatment of Innis
by finding that defendant was in custody at the time of the police
initiated "handicapped child conversation. "90 Thus, the first prong
of the Miranda custodial interrogation test was met. The court
then determined that an interrogation violating Miranda had
occurred. 91 The violation was predicated on two factors. First, the
v. Innis, 13 SUFFOLK L. REV. 591 (1979) for compilation of federal and state court
treatment of "interrogation" cases.
83. 465 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1972).
84. [d. at 99.
85. 438 S.W.2d 82, 84-85 (Ky. 1969).
86. 44 Ill. 2d 541, 256 N.E.2d 753 (1970).
87. Id. at 54445, 256 N.E.2d at 755-56.
88. 445 Pa. 292, 285 A.2d 172 (1971).
89. Id. at 297, 285 A.2d at 175.
90. 391 A.2d at 1161.
9l. As noted in text accompanying note 72 supra, Miranda prohibits further in
terrogation if an individual indicates that he wishes to consult with an attorney in
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court was persuaded by the factual similarities between Innis and
Brewer v. Williams. 92 Second, a subjective evaluation of the cir
cumstances under which the police conversation took place, as
viewed by the present defendant, indicated that Innis had been in
terrogated.
A.

Reliance on Brewer

The Rhode Island Supreme Court's holding is assailable on
several grounds, even though its conclusion can be supported by
the applIcation of a different test. 93 First, the state court empha
sized that the United States Supreme Court had upheld a finding
of interrogation in Williams in a factual setting that differed from
Innis in "constitutionally insignificant [ways]. "94 Although the cases
were similar in several respects, the United States Supreme Court
decided Williams on sixth and not fifth amendment grounds and
the discussion of interrogation was considered "constitutionally ir
relevant."95 The Williams Court, however, seemed to confuse the
fifth and sixth amendments. 96 The Rhode Island Supreme Court's
use of Wil{iaTns as support for its finding of an interrogation in
Innis, therefore, is understandable.
In Williams, defendant was arraigned on abduction charges in
Davenport, Iowa and accompanied by two police officers on a
160-mile ride to Des Moines, where the abduction arrest warrant
had been issued. 97 Prior to the drive, Williams spoke with a Des
Moines attorney. The attorney instructed Williams not to discuss
the abduction with the police. The lawyer also obtained a promise
from Detective Learning that the latter would not interrogate
Williams on the trip to Des Moines. 98 En route, Detective
Learning, who believed that the abducted girl was dead and who

the course of a custodial interrogation. This safeguard exists in addition to the warn
ing about the right to counsel that must be given before the police begin a custodial
interrogation. Innis requested counsel but had not yet seen an attorney when the
handicapped child conversation occurred. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that the conversation constituted an interrogation which had occurred before the po
lice complied with Innis' request for counsel. 391 A.2d at 1162.
92. 430 U.S. at 387.
93. See text accompanying notes 193-206 infra.
94. 391 A.2d at 1162.
95. Kamisar, supra note 73, at 4.
96. Id. at 33.
97. 430 U.S. at 391-92.
98. Id. at 401 n.8. But see Kamisar, Foreword: Brewer v. Williams-A Hard
Look at a Discomfiting Record, 66 GEO. L.J. 209, 212 n.23 (1977), in which the au
thor maintains that the record does not indicate that such an agreement was made.
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knew that Williams was deeply religious and a former mental pa
tient, delivered the infamous "Christian burial speech."99 Ad
dressing Williams as "Reverend," Leaming stressed that the par
ents of the abducted child were entitled to have a Christian burial
for their daughter. 100 Williams was told not to answer but to "think
about it. "101 As the car approached Des Moines, Williams indi
cated that he would take the police to the body.102 At the murder
trial, the judge admitted evidence related to statements Williams
had made in the car on the ground that Williams had waived his
sixth amendment right to counsel. 103
The United States Supreme Court held that Williams was de
prived of his sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to counsel. 104
The sixth amendment states, "in all criminal prosecutions, the ac
cused shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for
his defense. "105 The Court found no waiver by Williams of these
rights. lOS The Court also stated that there was no need to review
the doctrine of Miranda, designed to secure the fifth amendment
right against compulsory self-incrimination, because of the sixth
amendment violation in the case. 107
In Williams, the Supreme Court said that the sixth amend
ment case of Massiah v. United States 108 gives an individual the
right to legal representation during interrogation once adversary
proceedings against him have commenced. 109 The Court found that
judicial proceedings against Williams had commenced before the
start of the ride to Des Moines because an arrest warrant had been
issued upon which Williams had been arraigned. 110 The Court
then found that the Christian burial speech was "tantamount to in
terrogation" and that no sixth amendment right would have at
tached "if there had been no interrogation. "111
The sixth amendment rule of Massiah was enunciated incor

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

430 U.S. at 392.
Id. at 393.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 394.
Id. at 397-98.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
430 U.S. at 404.
Id. at 397.
377 U.S. at 201.
430 U.S. at 401.
110. Id. at 399.
111. Id. at 400.
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rectly by the Williams Court. 112 Massiah held that, once adversary
proceedings have commenced against an individual, he has a right
to legal representation whether or not the government interrogates
him.1l3 Massiah involved no police "interrogation" as the term is
normally used because there were no compelling influences pre
sent.1l4 Instead, Massiah involved a defendant who, after being in
dicted and released on bail, made incriminating statements while
talking with his codefendant in a car owned by the latter. 115 A ra
dio transmitter had been installed in the car to enable federal
agents, with whom codefendant was cooperating, to overhear the
conversation. 116 The Court held that defendant was denied his
sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel when "there was
used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating
words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him
after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel. "11 7
The Massiah Court relied upon language in Spano v. United
States .118 The Spano Court struck a confession based upon the to
tality of the circumstances under which the confession had been
obtained. 119 The police obtained the Spano confession through a
jailhouse interrogation that occurred after indictment and in the
absence of counsel. Four concurring Justices in Spano advanced
the view that the right to assistance of counsel attaches once a per
son is formally charged, or once adversary proceedings otherwise
have been initiated against him.12o Unless the right to assistance of
counsel is waived, any incriminating statements made in the ab
sence of counsel in such circumstances will be excluded. 121 The
views of the Spano concurring Justices appeared to form the basis
of Massiah. 122

112. See Kamisar, supra note 73, at 33.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 377 U.S. at 202-03.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 206.
118. Id. at 204-06 (relying on Spano v. United States, 360 U.S. 315 (1959)).
119. Id. at 323.
120. Id. at 324 (Douglas, J., with Black & Brennan, H., concurring); id. at 326
(Stewart, J., with Douglas & Brennan, H., concurring).
121. Id. at 324 (Douglas, J., with Black & Brennan, H., concurring); id. at 326
(Stewart, J., with Douglas & Brennan, H., concurring).
122. The Massiah Court noted that the Spano opinion rested upon the totality
of the circumstances under which the confession had been obtained. The Massiah
majority then quoted considerable portions of the Spano concurrences and stated
that the view of concurring Justices reflected a constitutional principle that had been
broadly reaffirmed by the Court since Spano. 377 U.S. at 205.
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It was immaterial to the Massiah Court whether the incriminat
ing statements were elicited in a coercive or noncoercive setting. 123
The Court found it irrelevant that in Spano:
The defendant was interrogated in a police station, while here
[in Massiah] the damaging testimony was elicited from the de
fendant without his knowledge ... "if such a rule [the rule advo
cated by the concurring justices in Spano] is to have any efficacy
it must apply to indirect and surreptitious interrogations as well
as those conducted in the jailhouse . . . ."124

The timing of the governmental efforts to obtain incriminating
statements was significant to the Massiah Court. To stress its con
cern over the element of timing, the Court cited language from
Powell v. Alabama: 125 "during .... the most critical period of the
proceedings ... that is to say, from ... arraignment until the be
ginning of their trial, when consultation, . . . investigation and
preparation [are] vitally important, the defendants . . . [are] . . .
entitled to such aid [of counsel] during that pe,riod as at the trial it
self. "126 Thus, in Massiah the indicted defendant clearly was enti
tled to the assistance of counsel at the time of the surreptitious po
lice activity. The absence of counsel at this time led the Court to
exclude defendant's incriminating statements.
Massiah demonstrates that the presence of a fifth amendment
kind of interrogation127 is immaterial in sixth amendment cases.
The United States Supreme Court in Innis made a similar observa
.tion. The Court indicated that the Rhode Island Supreme Court
erred in looking to Brewer for guidance in defining a Miranda in
terrogation. The Court stated that "[t]he definitions of 'interroga
tion' under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, if indeed the term
'interrogation' is even apt in the Sixth Amendment context, are not
necessarily interchangeable, since the policies underlying the two
constitutional protections are quite distinct. "128
This statement becomes clearer when the underlying ration
ales for the fifth and sixth amendments are examined. The sixth

123. See Kamisar, supra note 73, at 4l.
124. 377 U.S. at 206.
125. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
126. 377 U.S. at 205 (quoting language from Powell v. Alabama, id).
127. For fifth amendment purposes, interrogation is defined as police-induced
pressures which impair the defendant's capacity to decide rationally whether to
speak to the police about the alleged offense. See text accompanying notes 68 & 78
supra.
128. 446 U.S. at 300 n.4.
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amendment ensures that the defendant has legal, assistance in any
critical confrontation with the state after judicial proceedings have
begun. 129 Counsel helps the defendant to make wise decisions in
preparing his case and shields him from state efforts to obtain self
incriminating evidence. 13o The amendment thus can be read to im
ply that, after a certain point, a criminal proceeding becomes accu
satorial rather than inquisitorial: 131 In Rogers v. Richrrwnd 132 it
was held that, under the accusatorial system, "the State must es
tablish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and
may not by.coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his
own mouth. "133 While our system has inquisitorial attributes, such
as police interrogation, investigative grand juries, and undercover
surveillance, the sixth amendment has been read to prohibit these
activities after the accusatorial process has begun. 134
To summarize, if police talk with the defendant after the be
ginning of judicial proceedings, it is the timing of the conversation
that brings the sixth amendment into play. Once the sixth amend
ment attaches it prohibits all police efforts, if they are "tantamount
to interrogation," to obtain self-incriminating evidence from the de
fendant. 1as
Even if the sixth amendment is not applicable to a factual set
ting because judicial proceedings have not yet begun, the fifth
amendment right against compelled self-incrimination might apply.
In contrast to the sixth amendment, which is concerned with the
timing of police conversations with the accused, the fifth amend
ment is concerned solely with coercion in a confrontation between
the police and the accused. 136 Fifth amendment analysis differs
from sixth amendment analysis because the fifth prohibits only
compelled self-incrimination, regardless of when it occurs. Thus,

129. Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis: A Need to Reconsider the Constitutional
Premises Underlying the Law of Confessions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv, 1, 16 (1979).
130. ld. at 9-10.
131. ld. at 23.
132. 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
133. ld. at 541 (1961).
134. Grano, supra note 129, at 24. Language from Massiah supports this view:
lilt was pointed out [in Spano] that under our system of justice the most ele
mental concepts of due process of law contemplate that an indictment be
followed by a trial, "in an orderly courtroom, presided over by a judge, open
to the public, and protected by all the procedural safeguards of the law."
377 U.S. at 204.
135. Grano, supra note 129, at 10.
136. See text accompanying notes 44-47 supra.
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the question of interrogation need not be resolved identically for
fifth and sixth amendment purposes. Fifth amendment interroga
tion includes only police conduct exerting a compelling influence
on the accused that impairs the accused's capacity to determine
whether to remain silent. l37 Interrogation for the sixth amendment
includes all police conduct likely to elicit incriminating evidence
from the defendant that occurs after judicial proceedings have
begun. l3s
It is clear, therefore, that the Williams Court's characterization
of the Christian burial speech as "tantamount to interrogation" was
dicta since it had no relevance to the sixth amendment holding of
the case. l39 The Williams majority decision failed to rest its holding
on the coercive setting under which the speech took place. A coer
cive setting is necessary for a finding of interrogation within the
meaning of the fifth amendment. Accordingly, the "tantamount to
interrogation" language should have no precedential value for Innis
or for other fifth amendment cases. l40
Even if the Williams interrogation language initially provides
guidance for fifth amendment cases, two further considerations
counsel against placing primary reliance upon it. First, four Jus
tices dissented vigorously to the Williams majority's classification of
the Christian burial speech as tantamount to interrogation. l4l The
views of interrogation taken by the dissenting Justices are "dis
turbing" to one noted commentator. l42 Their opinions show deep
137. See text accompanying notes 68 & 78 supra.
138. Grano, supra note 114, at 41 n.260.
139. This assertion presumes that the Williams majority considered the "Chris
tian burial speech" to be an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda but not
Massiah. Although it is possible that the Williams majority viewed the "burial"
speech as a Massiah interrogation, this conclusion appears unlikely given the context
in which the reference appeared. For example, prior to its "tantamount to interroga
tion" language, the Williams Court stated "that Detective Learning deliberately and
designedly set out to elicit information from Williams just as surely as ... if he had
formally interrogated him." 430 U.S. at 399. This language suggests concern over the
Miranda concept of a coercive setting where police pressures affect the accused's
ability to make rational decisions, rather than the Massiah concept of the timing of
the conversation. See Kamisar, supra note 73, at 4 n.27. Thus, it is fair to conclude
that the interrogation language related to fifth amendment concerns and was consti
tutionally irrelevant to the final sixth amendment holding of the Williams case.
140. If W~lliams were analyzed as a Miranda fifth amendment case, strong ar
guments could be made that the police conduct violated the protection against
compelled self-incrimination. See Kamisar, supra note 73, at 23. A comparison of
Innis with Williams would then be persuasive.
141. 430 U.S. at 419 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 439 (Blackmun, J., with
White & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
142. See Kamisar, supra note 73, at 5-24.
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division within the Court on the interrogation issue. Given the
strong wording of the dissents and the cursory treatment given by
the majority to the interrogation issue, Williams is not conclusive
authority for fifth amendment interrogation issues. Second, if the
subjective police officer standard, implicitly used by the Williams
majority to determine whether an interrogation had occurred, were
employed in fifth amendment cases the protections created by
Miranda would be eroded. The Williams Court stated, "Detective
Leaming deliberately and designedly set out to elicit information
from Williams. "143 This language suggests that the test for an inter
rogation must focus on the subjective intentions of the police. As
discussed below,144 this test, standing alone, does not secure the
amount of protection envisioned by Miranda for custodial suspects
facing police-induced pressure to discuss the alleged crime.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court should have placed little
reliance on Williams' "tantamount to interrogation" language in de
termining whether an impermissible interrogation of Innis oc
curred. The Rhode Island court should have focused on whether the
requisite degree of compulsion existed at the time Innis made his
incriminating statement. Miranda requires such compulsion before
an interrogation within the meaning of the fifth amendment will be
found to have occurred.
B.

Rhode Island Suprerru: Court Analysis of Compulsion
The Rhode Island Supreme Court did address the "potential .
for compulsion" existing at the time of the police conversation in
Innis. The court, however, did not employ the most workable
standard in its evaluation of the conversation. In addition, its analy
sis was incomplete.
In analyzing the coercion aspect, the state supreme court re
jected the state's key argument. The state maintained that the offi
cer who made the handicapped child remarks was expressing con
cern for public safety and not intentionally eliciting incriminating
statements from Innis. The state argued that, since the police had
not intended to coerce defendant, no interrogation occurred. 145 In
rejecting this analysis, the state court did not focus upon the
undisclosed, subjective intention of the police during the conversa
tion. Instead, the court looked to the subjective impressions of de

143. 430 U.S. at 399 (emphasis added).
144. See text accompanying notes 184-90 infra.
145. 391 A.2d at 1162.
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fendant upon hearing the conversation: "the defendant, alol1e in a
police wagon with three officers at 4 a.m., underwent the same
psychological pressures which moved Williams [the defendant in
Brewer v. Williams] to lead police to the body of his victim."l46
The test used by the court represents a better application of the
Miranda rationale than the standard it rejected. The court's test is
more harmonious with Miranda because Miranda was designed to
provide the defendant with the means to resist the pressures of
custodial interrogation, regardless of the inner motives of the po
lice in conducting the session. As developed more fully below, 147
police intent is an inadequate gauge for determining the presence
of an interrogation.
The state court test, which examines the subjective impres
sions of the defendant, however, creates problems of proof. De
termining how each person views his situation "would require a
prescience which neither the police nor anyone else possesses. "148
A more workable test is the objective, reasonable person standard
discussed below. 149
Another factor contributing to the weakness of the Rhode Is
land decision was the incomplete discussion of the "potential for
compulsion" upon which the impermissible interrogation was
based. Miranda was premised upon the presence of the potential
for compelled self-incriminating statements. ISO The Miranda Court
examined the physical surroundings and the atmosphere of police
dominated settings and their impact upon the defendant to de
termine if the potential for compelled self-incrimination existed.
Interrogation within Miranda was described in terms of po
lice-created compulsion that impaired the capacity of the defen
dant to decide rationally whether to talk with the police. lSI To de
termine if Miranda extended to the nonstationhouse setting of
Innis, the state court should have asked, under the most workable
test, if there were sufficiently compelling circumstances to prevent
a reasonable person in the position of Innis from deciding rationally
whether to talk to the police. Factors to consider would have in
cluded the amount, of contact between Innis and the police, the

146.
147.
148.
U.S. 990
149.
150.
151.

ld.
See text accompanying notes 184-90 infra.
United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
(1970).
See text accompanying notes 193-206 infra.
384 U.S. at 461.
ld. at 465, 467.
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content of the conversation, a comparison of the police car setting
with the stationhouse setting found sufficiently compelling in
Miranda, the time of day, the number, demeanor, and rank of the
police involved, and any other important factors influencing com
pulsion. The state court only focused on the time of the conversa
tion, its location, and the number of individuals present. 152
In conclusion, the Rhode Island Supreme Court based its find
ing of a fifth amendment interrogation upon a sixth amendment
case and upon a subjective custodial defendant standard that in
volves difficult problems of proof. Nevertheless, the result reached
by the state court is supportable under a fully developed, reason
able person test. 153
IV.

BURGER COURT MAJORITY DECISION

After reviewing the Innis interrogation issue, the United
States Supreme Court held:
the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in
custody is subjected to either express questioning or its func
tional equivalent. That is to say, the term "interrogation" under
Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any
words or actions on the part of the police (other than those nor
mally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses pri
marily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the in
tent of the police. 154

Although there are laudable aspects to the decision,155 it signifi
cantly reduces the protections Miranda provided for the custodial
suspeCt subjected to compelling police pressures to talk about the
alleged crime. The decision must also be read to reject an ap
proach that more faithfully adheres to the underlying goals of
Miranda. ISS
152. 391 A.2d at 1162.
153. See text accompanying notes 193-206 infra.
154. 446 U.S. at 300-01.
155. In defining interrogation, the Court did not limit itself to express ques
tioning, but included certain "words or actions on the part of the police." Id. at
298-99. This view reflects a reasoned understanding of Miranda which dealt with the
interrogation environment created by a variety of stationhouse custodial interrogation
practices. As one commentator observed, "unless Miranda and the privilege against
self-incrimination it is designed to effectuate were to become empty gestures in cus
todial surroundings, the Court could not have intended to limit their applicability to
only ... verbal conduct ending in question marks." Kamisar, supra note 73, at 14.
156. See text following note 194 infra.
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The test enunciated by the Court is primarily an objective,
reasonable police officer standard. The Court also included a sub
jective police test as one factor to consider in arriving at a final
conclusion. This note analyzes both tests ~nd the problems inher
ent in each.
/

A.

Objective, Reasonable Police Officer Test

Examination of the Court's definition of interrogation reveals
an objective, reasonable police officer test. The Court held that an
interrogation occurs either through express police questioning or
through any police words or actions that the police should know
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect. 157 This test should be rejected for numerous reasons.
First, it is a substantial departure from the foundations of Miranda.
Miranda was designed to alert the suspect in custodial interroga
tion settings of his right to remain silent. 158 The warnings were
created to ensure that the suspect was made aware of his rights at
a time when he was confused and uncertain as to the tactics his
captors were prepared to employ in order to obtain a confession. 159
Ideally, Miranda calls for evaluation of the "potential for compul
sion" needed to find an interrogation from the viewpoint of each
suspect placed in a police-dominated setting. This test would be
difficult to apply, however, because the workings of an individual
mind are too complex for a truly subjective standard. Further,
courts cannot be expected to decide cases solely on the basis of
self-serving statements by defendants. ISO
The Innis Court's objective police officer standard, however,
erodes the protections created by Miranda in viewing interrogation
through the eyes of the police. The decision enables the police to
devise interrogation techniques and then forces the courts to judge
the acceptability of the tactics according to the standards of the
creator. The erosion is particularly significant because many of the
protections envisioned by Miranda for the custodial suspect have
not materialized. One commentator found that the police are likely
to use any interrogation tactic that has not been expressly prohib
ited by the courts. lSI Moreover, in analyzing the circumstances
157. 446 U.S. at 301.
158. 384 U.S. at 467.
159. Kamisar, supra note 78, at 51. See also 384 U.S. at 467.
160. Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: What Constitutes
Custodial Interrogation?, 25 S.C. L. REV. 699, 713 (1974).
161. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 581,
598 (1979).
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surrounding an interrogation, many trial judges are tempted to de
fer to the judgment of the police. 162 When the new Court test is
superimposed upon these realities, the protection of the custodial
suspect is further jeopardized.
A second objection to the objective police officer test is the
failure of the Court to anticipate problems of proof that surely will
develop. In footnote eight, the Court stated, "any knowledge the
police may have had concerning the unusual susceptibility of a de
fendant to a particular form of persuasion might be an important
factor in determining whether the police should have known that
their words or actions were reasonably likely to elicit an in
criminating response from the suspect. "163 The Court did not indi
cate how obvious the special susceptibility must be before the po
lice will be held to have known about the reasonably likely effect of
their words or actions. As Chief Justice Burger observed in his
concurring opinion, "few ... police officers are competent to make
the kind of evaluation . . . contemplated; even a psychiatrist . . .
would . . . employ extensive . . . observation to make the judg
ment now charged to police officers."164
The substance of footnote eight is also objectionable because it
focuses attention on one defendant in one setting. Courts are not
asked to evaluate the coerciveness of specific police tactics upon a
reasonable person in the position of the suspect. Thus, the limited
amount of protection provided by the footnote is available only on
a case-by-case basis. The Court did not compensate for the limita
tions of footnote eight in any other manner. If the Court had also
employed the objective, reasonable person test in conjunction with
footnote eight, then defendants with "normal" susceptibilities, as
well as defendants with "unusual" susceptibilities, would be pro
tected. But the Court rejected the reasonable person test in favor
of the objective police officer standard. Thus, a decision in one
case will provide little or no guidance in another case involving a 
different defendant with different susceptibilities. The conse
quences of such a pure case-by-case approach have been aptly de
scribed. Former United States Supreme Court Justice Clark stated
that, by use of the case-by-case approach, "we do not shape the
conduct of local police one whit; unpredictable reversals on dissim
ilar fact situations are not likely to curb the zeal of the police and

162. [d. 163. 446 U.S. at 302 n.B.
164. [d. at 304 (Burger, C.]., concurring).
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prosecutors who may be intent on racking up a high percentage of
successful prosecutions. "165 Similarly, since the courts and police
will receive little guidance from prior cases in applying the new
Innis test, the danger that the police will conduct their interroga
tions without regard for the constitutional rights of the suspect in
creases. 1SS
The problems inherent in the Court's objective police officer
standard become apparent upon application of the test to the Innis
facts. The Court examined the subject matter of th~ po4ce officer's
remarks, the length of the police-suspect conversation, the de
meanor of the suspect, and the number of police present during
the conversation.
Analysis of the content of the conversation is an important fac
tor that deserves considerable weight. Trickery and deceit are sta
ples of current police interrogation practices1S7 and often success
fully produce confessions. For example, one widely read manual
outlines specific techniques to be used in interrogating a suspect.
Most of the techniques involve some form of deception because the
officer is required to make statements that he knows are untrue or
to playa role that is inconsistent with his actual feelings. l68 The
Supreme Court did not find the police comments about
handicapped children to be "particularly evocative" under the ob
jective police officer test. 1S9 The dissents strongly disagreed with
this conclusion. Their belief that the comments were highly evoca
tive presents the better view, either because they realistically ap
plied the objective police officer test170 or because a reasonable
person in the place of Innis would have responded to the com
ments just as Innis reacted. l71
In applying the objective police officer test the Court exam
ined several factors contributing to the atmosphere in which the
police-suspect exchange occurred. These factors demand consider
able weight because together they describe the -level of coercion
present during the exchange. The Miranda safeguards were de
165. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1954) (Clark, J., concurring)
(evaluating the case-by-case voluntariness approach used prior to Miranda).
166. White, supra note 161, at 597.
167. Id. at 581.
168. Id. at 582.
169. 446 U.S. at 303.
170. Justices Marshall and Brennan applied the objective police officer
standard in a realistic manner and could "scarcely imagine a stronger appeal to the
conscience of a suspect." Id. at 306 (Marshall, J., with Brennan, J., dissenting).
171. See text accompanying notes 201-06 infra.
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signed to protect a custodial suspect from police-induced pressures
that might impair his ability to determine freely whether to talk
with the police. Thus, careful analysis of the surrounding circum
stances is crucial to Miranda. The Innis Court looked at the length
of the police-suspect exchange and noted that it was brief. 172 The
Court also considered defendant's demeanor. The Court found
nothing in the record to suggest that the police knew that Innis
was unusually disoriented or upset at the time of his arrest. 173 The
Court also mentioned that the handicapped children remarks were
exchanged between two police officers. 174 The Court was im
pressed that the police neither invited a response from Innis175 nor
carried on a lengthy harangue in his presence. 176 These factors
were not impressive to the dissenters. Justices Marshall and
Brennan stated that, "Gleckman's remarks would obviously have
constituted interrogation if they had been explicitly directed to re
spondent, and the result should not be different because they were
nominally addressed to [Officer] McKenna."177 Justice Stevens
found that the majority had turned Miranda's unequivocal rule
against any interrogation at all into a trap in which unwary suspects
might be caught by police deception. According to Justice Stevens,
"if a suspect does not appear to be susceptible to a particular type
of psychological pressure, the police are apparently free to exert
that pressure on him despite his request for counsel, so long as
they are careful not to punctuate their statements with question
marks."178 The dissents present the better view since Miranda was
concerned with the impact of police pressures upon the custodial
suspect. 179 Thus, it is immaterial whether the police remarks were
directed to Innis or to a fellow police officer. The crucial fact re
mains that the police remarks created an atmosphere of coercion
that caused Innis to respond by incriminating himself. 180
In its examination of the surrounding circumstances under the
objective police officer test, the majority failed to consider the po
lice car setting in which the conversation occurred. This factor de
mands the most analysis and its resolution merits the most weight
172. 446 U.S. at 30.
173. [d. at 302-03.
174. [d. at 302.
175. [d.
176. [d. at 303.
177. [d. at 306 (Marshall, J., with Brennan, J., dissenting).
178. [d. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179. See text accompanying notes 68-76 supra.
180. This result would have been foreseeable under the reasonable person test,
discussed in text accompanying notes 193-206 infra.
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in the overall interrogation decision because Miranda focused on
the potential for compulsion created by the police-dominated envi
ronment in which a custodial interrogation took place. 181 Removing
the defendant from the psychological support of friends, relatives,
and familiar surroundings can create significant pressures that im
pair the defendant's capacity to decide rationally whether to talk to
the police. It is thus noteworthy that the Court made no mention
of the police car setting in which the conversation occurred. The
omission is even more glaring because many lower courts have
found the existence of a custodial interrogation when the police
suspect exchange occurred in or near a police vehicle. 182 These
181. See text accompanying notes 73-79 supra.
182. In United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977) the Court de
scribed the coerciveness of the police car setting:
[t]he prisoner and police officers are in close contact within a confined area.
Often, the inside door handles are removed and the front and back seats are
separated by wire mesh ... Invariably, the prisoner is handcuffed.. He is ef
fectively cut off from the world outside the patrol car. As a practical matter,
he has no access to friends or counsel. If the prisoner has just been arrested,
he may still be disoriented and apprehensive in an often hostile and' alien
setting. In short, the back seat of a patrol car as the setting for a confession
conforms in all respect(s) to the "incommunicado, police-dominated" atmos
phere which led the Supreme Court in Miranda ... to recognize the need
for special procedures to minimize the inherent coerciveness of custodial in
terrogation.
[d. at 551. In Myers v. State, 3 Md. App. 534, 240 A.2d 288 (1968), defendant, who
was the prime suspect in a murder investigation, was located by police, placed in a
police car with two officers, and interrogated as the car moved to police headquar
ters. The court held that defendant had been subjected to custodial interrogation.
The court found that the atmosphere created at the time of the questioning carried
"its own badge of intimidation." [d. at 538, 240 A.2d at 291. The court appeared to
use an objective, reasonable person test. It cited language from People v. Hazel, 252
Cal. App. 2d 412, 60 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1967) which stated that the custodial require
ment of Miranda depended on the reasonable belief of the suspect that his freedom
of movement or action is restricted by the interrogation. [d. at 537, 240 A.2d at 290.
Although the Myers court addressed the custodial and not the interrogation issue, the
tests for both issues should be identical. See note 187 infra. In United States v.
Kennedy, 573 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1978), defendant was confined to the back seat of a
Federal Bureau of Investigation [hereinafter referred to as the FBI] vehicle with one
agent. A second agent sat in the front seat during questioning which lasted forty-five
minutes. The court used an objective, reasonable person test because it asked if a
reasonable person would have believed himself to be in custody. [d. at 660. Al
though the Kennedy court addressed the custodial issue, the test for custody and in
terrogation should be the same. See note 187 infra. The Kennedy court found that
the totality of the circumstances supported the reasonable belief that defendant was
in .custody. 573 F.2d at 660. No custodial interrogation was found to have occurred in
State v. Inman, 350 A.2d 582 (Me. 1976), when defendant was questioned by detec
tives in a police car en route to the police station. Defendant had not been arrested,
the investigation had not focused on him, he was in control of the situation, and he
was free from physical restraint. Hence, no coercive police atmosphere existed. The
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lower court cases suggest that, even under the objective police offi
cer test, Innis could have been subjected to considerable compul
sion to incriminate himself.
The Court also failed to discuss the time of day during which
the arrest and conversation took place. Lower courts have included
this factor in their analyses of the custodial interrogation issue. 183
This factor, in conjunction with others, conceivably could have cre
ated sufficient compulsion to justify a finding of interrogation even
under the objective police officer test. These analytical omissions
show that the Court failed to examine the Innis facts in sufficient
scope or depth to support its conclusion that no interrogation
occurred under the objective police officer test. The Court also
failed to indicate whether the overall interrogation decision rested
primarily upon the conclusion that the police statement was not
"particularly evocative" or upon the absence of sufficiently compel
ling surrounding circumstances. This failure to specifY precisely
what factors were crucial to the final decision hinders identification
of generally objectionable interrogation tactics that should be ille
gal per se. The courts, therefore, have not been told how to apply
the new Innis standard consistently.
B. Subjective Police Officer Factor
In footnote seven, the United States Supreme Court stated
that the
court used an objective, reasonable person test in concluding that no reasonable per
son in defendant's position could have considered himself to be in custody at the
time. [d. at 598-99. Similarly, no ~ustodial interrogation was found to have occurred
in United States v. Akin, 435 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1011
(1971), when FBI agents. questioned defendant in a Bureau car but used no force,
made no promises to induce defendant to give information, and left defendant
free to go at all times. The court appeared to use an objective, reasonable person test
based upon the factors it considered controlling: Lack of restraint, lack of promises to
induce the suspect to talk, and lack of force in questioning. [d. at 1013. But see
McCrary v. State, 529 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. App. 1975), in which the court found no cus
todial interrogation when police handcuffed and searched defendant after the latter
approached the police car and made suspicious movements toward his back pocket.
The court found no "compelling police atmosphere." [d. at 475. The court examined
the surrounding circumstances including the subjective intent of the police officer to
reach its decision. [d. For additional cases dealing with questioning in or near a po
lice vehicle, see Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565 § 14 (1970).
183. For example, in Commonwealth v. O'Shea, 456 Pa. 288, 318 A.2d 713,
cerl. denied, 419 U.S. 1092 (1974), the court held that defendant was subjected to
custodial interrogation when he was questioned in the middle of the night in a pri
vate room of the police building after the investigation had focused on him. The
court concluded that the police were not involved in an innocent attempt to gather
information. The court used a multiprong test because it stated that the Miranda
safeguards were required when there is custody plus police conduct calculated to,
expected to, or likely to evoke admissions. [d. at 292-93, 318 A.2d at 715.
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intent of the police ... may well have a bearing on whether the
police should have known that their words or actions were rea
sonably likely to ·evoke an incriminating response. In particular,
where a police practice is designed to elicit an incriminating re
sponse . . . it is unlikely that the practice will not also be one
which the police should have known was reasonably likely to
have that effect. 184

By including the subjective element of police intent within the
overall objective police officer test, the Court probably meant to
ensure the broadest possible protection of the right against
compelled self-incrimination. In those cases where the police
clearly intended to elicit an incriminating response from a custodial
suspect in violation of the Miranda procedures, a court presumably
would have little difficulty satisfying the objective, reasonable po
lice officer test upon which the Court places primary reliance. The
subjective police intent factor is unreliable in several respects, how
ever, so its inclusion does little to improve the objectionable fea
tures of the Court's principal standard, the objective police officer
test. This leaves the majority with two tests, neither of which is to
tally reliable standing alone or in conjunction with the other. The
Court failed to correct this problem because it did not include an
objective, reasonable person test for those cases where the objec
tive or subjective police officer tests fail to provide reliable an
swers.
Among the problems inherent in a subjective police officer
test is the matter of proof. A sophisticated officer, aware that his or
her intent will determine the admissibility of vital evidence, might
not testify candidly about the motivation for talking to or near the
suspect. ISS A second problem hampering the effectiveness of the
subjective police standard is its focus upon the undisclosed inten
tions of the police. Miranda was designed to protect the fifth
amendment rights of the suspect in coercive custodial settings re
gardless of the inner motivations of the participating police.
Finally, most courts judge the issue of custody without regard to
the subjective intentions of the police. ISS A similar approach
should be taken regarding the interrogation issue. IS7
184. 446 u.S. at 301-02 n.7.
185. White, supra note 21, at 66.
186. Most lower courts which have expressly considered the issue of custody
have adopted an objective reasonable person test. See Hunter v. State, 590 P.2d 888
(Alaska 1979) (collecting cases).
187. Miranda was designed to vest the custodial suspect with protections
against compelled self-incrimination. 384 U.S. at 461. The protections do not apply
unless both custody and interrogation are present. ld. at 445. Since both custody and
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In applying the subjective factor to the Innis facts, the Court
observed that the record in no way suggested that the officers' re
marks were designed to elicit a response. l88 Justice Stevens dis
agreed. He noted that the officers probably were aware that the
chances of a handicapped child finding the missing weapon at a
time when the police were not present were relatively slim. l89
Further, the officer responding to the initial handicapped children
remark did not suggest that they cordon off the area or notify
school officials. Instead, he emphasized that the police had to find
the weapon to avert a child's death. l9o Thus, the true purpose of
the conversation was probably not to voice genuine concern for the
welfare of the handicapped children.

C.

Summary of Supreme Court Majority Test

In summary, the objective and subjective police officer tests
set out by the United States Supreme Court majority to determine
the existence of a Miranda interrogation erode the underlying
premises of Miranda. Miranda sought to create a balance between
the interests of the police in obtaining confessions and the interests
of the custodial suspect in exercising his right against compelled
self-incrimination. Innis tips the scale in favor of the police by
using unreliable tests for the determination of an interrogation.
The Innis tests focus only on the objective or subjective actions of
the police and fail to consider how a reasonable person in the sus
pect's position would react to the police actions. The Court's omis
sion of the reasonable person standard leaves the suspect unpro
tected in those cases where problems of proof hamper the reliability
of either Innis test. The Court's unwillingness to explain its re
jection of the balance established by Miranda and its restrictive
conclusion itself, however, are consistent with the approach taken
by the Burger Court in recent years in dealing with other Miranda
issues. 19l
interrogation involve the impact of police behavior on the defendant, the same ana
lytical test should be used to determine their presence.
188. 446 U.S. at 303 n.9.
189. Id. at 316 n.19 (Stevens, J., dissenting), quoting White, supra note 21, at
68.
190. Brief of the Respondent Innis at 24, Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at
291.
191. See Stone, supra note 3, at 169. The Burger Court has been dismantling
Miranda in a piecemeal fashion by manipulating fringe issues yet leaving its core in
tact. Id. Evidence elicited from an individual through custodial interrogation when
he has not been warned properly of his rights is still inadmissible for use in the
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prosecution's case in chief. At the same time, however, the Court has allowed re
newed interrogation of an individual who previously asserted his right to remain si
lent. See discussion below of Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). The Court has
also defined the concept "custodial" narrowly. See discussion below of Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977). Further, the majority has not excluded evidence
solely on Miranda grounds in the last ten years. See Stone, supra note 3, at 10l. See
also Grano, supra note 129, at 3 n.17. The sole exception occurred in Tagne v.
Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469 (1980). The Court ruled that an inculpatory statement made
by the suspect to a police officer was inadmissible because there was no evidence
proving that the suspect knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights be
fore making the statement. Id. at 47l. In New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, the
Court held that "a person's testimony before a grand jury under a grant of immunity
cannot constitutionally be used to impeach him when he is a defendant in a later
criminal trial." Id. at 459-60. The Court based its ruling on the fifth and fourteenth
amendments, id. at 459, and not on Miranda. The Innis result clearly fits within this
established pattern. Innis also employs the multi-variable analysis used by the Court
to decide if Miranda protections apply.
Comparison of Innis with two other Supreme Court decisions demonstrates nu
merous analytical similarities. In Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), the Court
held that the Miranda dicta requiring all interrogation to cease once an individual
indicates a desire to remain silent, did not create a per se rule against all further in
terrogation. The Mosley Court noted that its decision did not deal with the proce
dures to be followed after a suspect asserted his right to counsel. Id. at 101 n.7. The
decision only concerned the procedures to be followed after assertion of the right to
remain silent. The right to counsel issue was present in Innis but was not addressed
by any of the courts. They dealt only with the definition of interrogation. The Mosley
Court upheld the admissibility of statements obtained in a later interrogation on the
ground that the initial assertion of Miranda rights "had been scrupulously honored."
Id. at 103 (quoting 384 U.S. at 479). As in Innis, the Mosley Court examined a variety
of factors including the different location of the second interrogation, use of a differ
ent interrogator, a lapse of two hours between the two sessions, a new set of warn
ings that preceded the second interrogation, and the allegedly different subject mat
ter covered in each meeting. Id. at 104. The Court failed to indicate which factors it
considered essential to meet its announced standard and thus the decision provides
ambiguous protection for the suspect due to its unpredictable application. Stone, su
pra note 3, at 135. The same can be said of Innis. See text accompanying note 166

supra.
In Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977), the Court took a restrictive view
of the meaning of "custody." The Court held that defendant was not subjected to
custodial interrogation, even though while on parole he was asked to go to police
headquarters for questioning, was told that the police believed he was involved in a
crime, and was falsely informed that his fingerprints had been found at the scene of
the crime. Id. at 493-95. The Court again failed to indicate which of the many factors
discussed were crucial to the decision. Stone, supra note 3, at 153. Undoubtedly, the
decision will have the same unpredictable results discussed above. The Court also
appeared to focus on the subjective intentions of the police officer; it did not use a
reasonable person test. Stone, supra note 3, at 153. Professor Stone argues that the
Mathiason court used the subjective police officer test due to the factors deemed
controlling by the majority: Mathiason went voluntarily to the police station, was ad
vised he was not under arrest, and left the police station without hindrance. The
Court thought it irrelevant that Mathiason was on parole at the time, that the ques
tioning occurred behind closed doors, that the police implied that a prosecution was
likely and that they indicated that they had substantial evidence of Mathiason's guilt.
Id. The Innis Court also used a subjective police officer intent test in reaching its
decision. See text accompanying notes 184-90 supra.

816

D.

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:787

Return to Voluntariness Standard

The analysis used by the Burger Court in its treatment of
Innis and other Miranda cases suggests a rejection of a wooden,
"prophylactic" application of Miranda and a return to the multi
factor voluntariness standard used prior to Miranda. 192 Although it
is beyond the scope of this note to comment on the merits of the
multifactor test, the Court could still achieve a "principled" appli
cation of Miranda by employing an objective, reasonable person
standard against which to judge the many factors present in each
case, rather than the tests used in Innis and earlier cases. Under
the reasonable person standard, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
finding of an "interrogation" would be affirmed.
V. INNIS VIEWED
FROM A REASONABLE PERSON PERSPECTIVE

Justice Stevens dissented to the Innis definition of interroga
tion and advanced an alternative. Under his definition, "any police
conduct or statements that would appear to a reasonable person in
the suspect's position to call for a response must be considered 'in
terrogation' . . . as well as those [statements] that are designed to
do so. "193 The entire test has merit. First, the objective, reason
able person standard avoids the problems of proof inherent in any
subjective test. As Judge Friendly wrote regarding the custodial
issue:
the [Miranda] Court could scarcely have intended the issue
. . . to be decideQ by swearing contests in which officers would
regularly maintain their lack of intention to assert power over a
suspect save when the circumstances would make such a claim
absurd, and defendants would assert with equal regularity that
they considered themselves to be significantly deprived of their
liberty the minute officers began to inquire of them. 194

The comment is equally valid when a subjective test is used to de
termine the presence of an interrogation.
A second reason to utilize the reasonable person test is its
preservation of the balance envisioned by Miranda. The test pro
vides the defendant with adequate protection from the potential of
police coercion, as viewed by a reasonable person in the place of
the defendant. The test does not, however, completely tie the
192.
193.
194.
U.S. 990

See Stone, supra note 3 at 168.
446 U.S. at 311 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
(1970).
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hands of the police. It does not require the police to anticipate the
frailties or idiosyncrasies of every person with whom they interact
or'speak.
Third, the test enables the courts to identify those tactics that
are objectionable in any factual setting. The test focuses on the re
sponse of a reasonable person in a coercive setting, not on the re
sponse of one particular suspect. This approach would provide the
police and the courts with more direction and certainty in inter
preting the law. Thus, though Miranda would be applied on a
case-by-case basis, there would be continuity to the decisions. As a
consequence, protection of the fifth amendment interests of the
custodial suspect would be increased.
Finally, inclusion of the subjective police officer portion of the
definition, in addition to the objective, reasonable person segment,
assures the broadest possible protection of the right to be free from
interrogation once the suspect is in custody and in a police
dominated environment. When the police clearly intended to elicit
an incriminating response from a custodial suspect in violation of
Miranda, an illegal interrogation would be found, without inquiry
as to whether the reasonable person test was satisfied. While prob
lems of proof remain unresolved in the subjective portion of Justice
Stevens' test,195 their significance is reduced since this is not the
sole standard under which an interrogation would be analyzed.
Justice Stevens also included the reasonable person test within his
definition. In contrast, the Innis majority failed to include an ob
jective, reasonable person standard within its definition of interroga
tion. This omission magnifies the problems of proof inherent in the
majority's subjective police officer standard. The majority thus
relies on two tests, the objective police officer test and the subjec
tive police officer test, both lacking in complete reliability, to de
termine the presence of an interrogation.
When Innis is analyzed under an objective, reasonable person
test, the potential for coercion that must exist for a Miranda inter
rogation clearly is present. The police conversation generated pres
sures and anxieties that a reasonable person would find compelling.
First, the content of the conversation challenged Innis to display
some evidence of honor and decency. Police manuals indicate that
criminal suspects are susceptible to such challenges and list them
as a standard and often successful interrogation tactic. 196 As aptly
phrased by dissenting Justices Marshall and Brennan, "one can
scarcely imagine a stronger appeal to the conscience of a suspect
195. See text accompanying note 185 supra.
196, See White, supra note 161, at 581.
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than the assertion that if the weapon is not found an . . . inno- .
cent person will be hurt ... a helpless, handicapped little girl. "197
It is likely that a reasonable person in Innis' position would find
such a challenge so compelling as to demand the response given by
Innis. This factor deserves considerable weight. 198
The setting in which the conversation occurred was highly
coercive from the perspective of a reasonable person in the posi
tion of Innis. The "handicap" remarks took place in a police car
where Innis sat handcuffed with three uniformed officers199 after
he had been arrested at gunpoint. 200 Many courts have found that
custodial interrogations occurred under an objective, reasonable
person test when a police officer spoke with an accused in a police
vehicle. 201 Other courts have carefully examined the effect that
handcuffs, a drawn gun, and the presence of several uniformed po
lice officers have on the demeanor of the accused and have found
that custodial interrogations transpired under the objective, reason
able person test or a subjective test. 202 Further, one commentator
has found that, in custodial settings where the norm governing spa
tial distance is violated, a person's instantaneous response is to
back up, again and again. When unable to escape, the person be
comes more anxious and unsure. 203 Additionally, although the
length of the police conversation was brief, it occurred at 4:30 a.m.
Other courts have found an interrogation to have occurred at such
an hour under similar circumstances using an objective, reasonable
person test. 204 Finally, the remarks themselves were compelling in
that they appeared to call for a response from a reasonable person
197. 446 U.S. at 306 (Marshall, J., with Brennan, J., dissenting).
198. See text accompanying notes 167-69 supra.
199. 446 U.S. at 306 (Marshall, J., with Brennan, J., dissenting).
200. Brief of the Respondent Innis at 4, Rhode Island v. Innis, id.
201. See cases cited in note 182 supra.
202. For example, in State v. Paz, 31 Or. App. 851, 572 P.2d 1036 (1977), the
court found that defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation after he was
handcuffed at gunpoint, taken into custody, transported in the back seat of a police
car to the police station, and informed that he was a suspect. The Court used an
objective, reasonable person test. [d. at 859, 572 P.2d at 1041. In People v. Shivers,
21 N.Y.2d 118, 233 N.E.2d 836, 286 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1967), the court found that com
pulsion was manifest when defendant was questioned on the street by police
at gunpoint about his activities. The court used two subjective tests. It stated that
the officer had no intention of letting defendant escape and that defendant could
have reached no different conclusion. [d. at 122, 233 N.E.2d at 839, 286 N.Y.S.2d at
830.
203. Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 42, 44-46 (1968).
204. See Commonwealth v. O'Shea, 456 Pa. 288, 318 A.2d 713, cert. denied,
419 U.S. 109 (1974).
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in the place of Innis. As noted by Justice Stevens, the conversation
indicated that the police had a strong desire to learn the location of
the shotgun. Any person with knowledge of the weapon's location
would be likely to believe that the officers wanted him to disclose
that site. Thus, an individual would believe that the officers were
seeking to solicit precisely the type of response given by Innis. 205
It is clear that the setting in which Innis made his incrim
inating statements was highly coercive as viewed from a reason
able person standard. This conclusion is the most important factor
in the interrogation analysis because the Miranda protections were
designed to dispel the atmosphere of coercion that accompanies
custodial interrogations. 206
In summary, by employing the same multivariable analysis
used by the Burger Court in previous Miranda cases, but by using
an objective, reasonable person standard to assess the importance
of each variable, it is clear that there was sufficient compulsion at
the time of the Innis police conversation to endanger defendant's
fifth amendment right. The compulsion exceeded that which would
have existed in mere arrest and detention. Thus, Innis was interro
gated within the meaning of Miranda.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Miranda sought to create a balance between the right of the
suspect to exercise his fifth amendment privilege against compelled
self-incrimination and the interests of the police in obtaining con
fessions. Miranda requires the police to issue certain warnings to
the cl.}-stodial suspect and lays out specific procedures once a sus
pect IS subjected to "custodial interrogation." Courts have strug
gled with this balance since Miranda by trying to refine the mean
ings of "custodial" and "interrogation." The United States Supreme
Court has unnecessarily tipped the balance in favor of the police by
its restrictive definition of "interrogation" in Innis. The Innis Court
has created two tests to evaluate the potential for compulsion
which must exist prior to a finding of an interrogation. The tests fo
cus solely upon the viewpoint of the police, without any reference
to the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the suspect's position.
The Court has failed to preserve the balance envisioned by
Miranda. It remains to be seen whether the lower courts will en
thusiastically adopt the Innis standards.
Jane Schussler
205. 446 U.S. at 312-13 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting White, supra note
218, at 68).
206. Id. at 310 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

